In my last blog “Why do Governments Engage in Mass Killing, February 18”, I wished Kenyans well in their strive for democracy and restoration of their faith in democracy. Wishes sometimes come true. The Wall Street Journal (Friday February 22), brought the good news.
According to the associated press: “Kenya’s government tentatively agreed to create a Prime Minister’s post to be filled by the opposition moving the East African country a step closer to ending weeks of deadly clashes over the disputed presidential election” (p. A8). In my piece, I wished for a sharing of power, which would ultimately lead to the restoration of the presidential office to the true winner. In the meantime, this sharing of power may be enough to assure Kenyan citizens that their democracy is not fragile, that it will endure. A sad note accompanying this good news, is that the ‘ethnic grievances and violence have left more than 1000 people dead”. Kenya violent conflict unfortunately, has put it in the book as given rise to Mass Killings (see http://attiatott.blogspot.com/ February 18, 2008 for definition of mass killing).
Over the past two years, we at the Institute for Economic Policy Studies have made efforts albeit modest, given our volunteerism efforts and our own resources (no outside support) to put forth the idea that developing ‘human resources’ should be at the forefront in the design, execution and funding for development. Education is and should be the building block for improving the economic conditions for the people. The development strategy often has been devoted to bricks and motors, not to human development or the right human development. It is not enough to throw money on education infrastructure (aside of the fact of being minuscule, compared to other infrastructures), rather it is much more important to ‘know’ how to make use of education infrastructure. Africa may surely lack education infrastructure but they surely have educators who can if challenged and channeled properly effect development.
The title of my piece today, Another Day, Another Gain was motivated by President Bush recent announcement. (Two Routes to Building Africa: Bush Visit (to Liberia) Emphasizes Human Development; Wall Street Journal, February 22, p.A8). US and Western powers are urged to focus more on human development. President Bush went further by announcing that the “US will provide one million text books for Liberia in the next year.” Clearly a step in the right direction. One may ask what text books and for what educational level: elementary, secondary or tertiary? The paper did not say. I am sure the details are now being worked out at the Agency for International Development.
It is a good step no matter what books or at what level. I have been taught that all books no matter how bad are good books in that they will make you think, they will make you see and feel what otherwise could not have been seen or felt and that what education is all about.
I have always wondered about what to do with the surplus of books many of us in Academia, especially those of us with long carriers, who will no longer have needs of these books. Even in the age of the internet there is still something about the wholesomeness of books. Hopefully, the President’s effort of building the reading capacity of Liberia’s people would extend beyond text books, and by opening the door for all who have books to channel these books to Africa would be users, he will indeed have succeeded in promoting knowledge, a vehicle often overlooked as the first building block for development.
Some of my former PhD students in Economics and myself are educators. We believe that education and the use of educators generated knowledge have been overlooked by development institutions, universities and donors. To that end, the Institute for Economic Policy Studies is sponsoring a conference to address this issue. We are encouraged by the President statements. Perhaps the day has finally come to put development on a sound footing.
Monday, February 25, 2008
Monday, February 18, 2008
Why do governments engage in civilian killings?
In a paper published in the Journal of Defense and Peace Economics (2008, vol. 19(2)) by colleague Sang Hoo Bae and Attiat F. Ott, we have investigated theoretically and empirically the predatory behavior of government: the case of mass killing. As such journal papers go; the model and the empirical analysis are not for general consumption. Nonetheless, the story it tells is not difficult to follow and the conclusions it arrives at is worth highlighting.
Before I summarize our findings, I need to acknowledge a contribution to this topic made by Hugo Slim in his book: Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality of War (Colombia University Press, 2008), reviewed by the Economist (February 16th, 2008, p.92). Although I have yet to read the book, the Economist’s review touches on a few of the issues we have addressed on our paper on mass killing. Our findings may go some way to answer the basic question raised: why kill civilians? Let me begin by citing few relevant statistics.
In the 20th century there were 109.7 million civilian killings by the state. This amounted to 4.35% of world population. In the 19th century, these were 19.4 million deaths or 1.65% of the world population, an increase of over 500 percent. According to the World Development Report 2005, most of the violent conflicts leading to civilian killings took place in low income developing countries, with 38% of these taking place in Africa.
Violent conflicts leading to mass killings of civilians fall into three categories: military conflict between states; between states and non-state groups; and between factions within a state. When we talk about civil war we are referring to the third category commonly referred to as “intra state” war. In this type, either the state (government) or a rebel group is the initiator. Examples of civil war include Angola civil war lasting 27 years with more than one million deaths, repeated wars in Sri Lanka with 500,000 deaths, Rwanda with over a million death to name a few. Mr. Slim gave reasons for civilian death including “a desire to exterminate an entire group of purportedly inferior beings; a lust for power and domination, necessity or plunder”, (The Economist, p.92). A student of violent conflicts especially civil wars can find not one but many causes for killing civilians. Sang Hoo Bae and myself being economists, we explain mass killings by the state by modeling the choice of a ruler of a country in which there are two distinct groups of populations (divided along ethnic, religion or other elements) by characterizing the decision as a three stage process. We investigate the ruler’s (assumed belonging to one group) options: engage in mass killings of the other group (initiate civil war); resolve the conflict by forming a coalition government; or do nothing.
Think of the current civil war in Kenya that started following the December 27 presidential elections. The ruler, President Mawai Kibaki is said to have lost the election to the opposition but refused to relinquish to Daila Odinga the presidency. The ruler, Mawai Kibaki options are those we have investigated in our paper. Our model solves for the optimal choice. We show that which option the ruler will choose depends on the “probability to remain in office which is derived from his political power; on the expected wealth from attacking the opposition group and the cost of the attack.” The cost can be of two types: military expenditures and cost of outside sanctions. In the Kenyan case, the flurry of activities by outsiders (the non-state group) including the US secretary of state, the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan may raise the cost and might tilt the choice towards a coalition government.
Using data on civilian mass killings over the period 1816 – 1997, we attempted to identify those factors that accounted for the choice of the mass killing option. But what mass killing constitutes? And who compile the data? The data is derived from the Correlates of War (COW) project. COW gives information on conflicts with more than 1000 battle related deaths. In the conflict studies, 1000 battle related deaths have been taken to signify mass killing. In our study we use this number and also redo the statistical analysis with 10,000 battle related deaths as defining a mass killing episode.
The statistical results of testing our model for the civilian mass killing that occurred between 1816 and 1997 give insight into the question raised earlier: the ruler’s choice of mass killing or as a Mr. Slim has put it: why kill civilians? Our findings reveal that “the length of executive tenure (how long the ruler held the office) plays a very significant role in civil war killings. In addition, it identified ethnicity, as a contributing factor, in that the “more fragmented the population – many ethnic groups – the less likely is mass killing and vice versa”. The results that were not unexpected had to do with spending on the military conflict and the income of the country. High military spending increases the probability of killings; the second the higher the income of the country the less likely the ruler is to engage in civilian mass killing.
The civil war in Kenya will hopefully come to an end before it belongs to the COW records where the civilian death rate reaches 1000. It would be a tragedy not only for the civilian population who are paying a heavy price for democracy but also for the world at large. The international community should persuade, cajole even compensate (bribe?) the ruler to restore democracy by opting for the power sharing arrangement for a limited period (to save face) and to restore the presidential office to the opposition if it turned out that Mr. Odinga was indeed the true winner.
Before I summarize our findings, I need to acknowledge a contribution to this topic made by Hugo Slim in his book: Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality of War (Colombia University Press, 2008), reviewed by the Economist (February 16th, 2008, p.92). Although I have yet to read the book, the Economist’s review touches on a few of the issues we have addressed on our paper on mass killing. Our findings may go some way to answer the basic question raised: why kill civilians? Let me begin by citing few relevant statistics.
In the 20th century there were 109.7 million civilian killings by the state. This amounted to 4.35% of world population. In the 19th century, these were 19.4 million deaths or 1.65% of the world population, an increase of over 500 percent. According to the World Development Report 2005, most of the violent conflicts leading to civilian killings took place in low income developing countries, with 38% of these taking place in Africa.
Violent conflicts leading to mass killings of civilians fall into three categories: military conflict between states; between states and non-state groups; and between factions within a state. When we talk about civil war we are referring to the third category commonly referred to as “intra state” war. In this type, either the state (government) or a rebel group is the initiator. Examples of civil war include Angola civil war lasting 27 years with more than one million deaths, repeated wars in Sri Lanka with 500,000 deaths, Rwanda with over a million death to name a few. Mr. Slim gave reasons for civilian death including “a desire to exterminate an entire group of purportedly inferior beings; a lust for power and domination, necessity or plunder”, (The Economist, p.92). A student of violent conflicts especially civil wars can find not one but many causes for killing civilians. Sang Hoo Bae and myself being economists, we explain mass killings by the state by modeling the choice of a ruler of a country in which there are two distinct groups of populations (divided along ethnic, religion or other elements) by characterizing the decision as a three stage process. We investigate the ruler’s (assumed belonging to one group) options: engage in mass killings of the other group (initiate civil war); resolve the conflict by forming a coalition government; or do nothing.
Think of the current civil war in Kenya that started following the December 27 presidential elections. The ruler, President Mawai Kibaki is said to have lost the election to the opposition but refused to relinquish to Daila Odinga the presidency. The ruler, Mawai Kibaki options are those we have investigated in our paper. Our model solves for the optimal choice. We show that which option the ruler will choose depends on the “probability to remain in office which is derived from his political power; on the expected wealth from attacking the opposition group and the cost of the attack.” The cost can be of two types: military expenditures and cost of outside sanctions. In the Kenyan case, the flurry of activities by outsiders (the non-state group) including the US secretary of state, the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan may raise the cost and might tilt the choice towards a coalition government.
Using data on civilian mass killings over the period 1816 – 1997, we attempted to identify those factors that accounted for the choice of the mass killing option. But what mass killing constitutes? And who compile the data? The data is derived from the Correlates of War (COW) project. COW gives information on conflicts with more than 1000 battle related deaths. In the conflict studies, 1000 battle related deaths have been taken to signify mass killing. In our study we use this number and also redo the statistical analysis with 10,000 battle related deaths as defining a mass killing episode.
The statistical results of testing our model for the civilian mass killing that occurred between 1816 and 1997 give insight into the question raised earlier: the ruler’s choice of mass killing or as a Mr. Slim has put it: why kill civilians? Our findings reveal that “the length of executive tenure (how long the ruler held the office) plays a very significant role in civil war killings. In addition, it identified ethnicity, as a contributing factor, in that the “more fragmented the population – many ethnic groups – the less likely is mass killing and vice versa”. The results that were not unexpected had to do with spending on the military conflict and the income of the country. High military spending increases the probability of killings; the second the higher the income of the country the less likely the ruler is to engage in civilian mass killing.
The civil war in Kenya will hopefully come to an end before it belongs to the COW records where the civilian death rate reaches 1000. It would be a tragedy not only for the civilian population who are paying a heavy price for democracy but also for the world at large. The international community should persuade, cajole even compensate (bribe?) the ruler to restore democracy by opting for the power sharing arrangement for a limited period (to save face) and to restore the presidential office to the opposition if it turned out that Mr. Odinga was indeed the true winner.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
